The major technical difficulty in the marriage of biometThis paper presents a method for changeable cryptographic rics with cryptography is due to the noisy nature ofbiometrics key generation using face biometrics signal. A previously insignal and the exactly correct requirement of cryptographic troduced scheme,fuzzy vault, is utilized for secure binding of key. The capability of variation tolerance is of fundamental randomly generated key with extracted biometrics features.
INTRODUCTION
The biometrics templates should be stored in a format such that the user's privacy is protected even the storage device is Cryptography is an important technique in information secu-compromised. rity and some related applications, particularly in encryption, A few recent research proposals have been introduced to authentication, and access control. Traditional cryptographic link biometrics with cryptography, the majority of which fosystems verify the authenticity of an individual based on the cus on two biometrics modalities, fingerprints [4] [5] [6] and iris possession of a cryptographic key. Due to the large length [7] . Although many solutions have been suggested, the proband randomness of the key (e.g., 128-bit key for AES [1] ), a lem of mapping signals such as face images into unique and short password is usually used to encrypt the cryptographic robust cryptographic keys presents significant challenges. The key. The user only needs to remember the short password to objective of this research is to develop a systematic frameretrieve the key. By using this method, the cryptographic key work for effective combination of biometrics with cryptoghas the same level of security as that of the password, which raphy to generate changeable keys with privacy preservable can be forgotten and stolen [2] . and changeable biometrics representation. In this paper, we Biometrics based authentication systems confirm an inexplore the use of a previously proposed scheme ,fuzzy vault dividual's identity based on the physiological and/or behav- [8] , for cryptographic key generation in a face based authentiioral characteristics of the individual [3] . It has intrinsic adcation scenario. Specifically, we introduce two schemes based vantages over password based methods. Biometrics based on user-independent and user-dependent mappings. The usermethod provides direct link between the service and actual independent method utilize the same set of parameters for all user. With biometrics, there is nothing to lose or forget, and it users. The user-dependent method is a two factor scheme with is relatively difficult to circumvent [2] . Biometrics and crypdistinct parameters for different users. The experimentation tography are two most prominent and complementary solu-shows that the user-dependent scheme is capable of productions for user authentication, data integrity preservation, and ing zero error rate and changeable biometrics representation. trustworthy verification. By combining biometrics with crypThe remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sectography, high level of security can be expected. Effective tion 2 provides a brief review of related works. The details of combination of biometrics with cryptography will have sigthe proposed methods are presented in Section 3. In section nificant contribution to secure data exchange over Internet, 4, we present the experimental results. Section 5 provides and reliable digital right management.
conclusion and future works. [12] . For a given set of features x C R', the This section presents the proposed methods for face based polynomialf(x) can then be evaluated at each element xi and cryptographic key generation. Fig. 1 depicts the diagramstore all pairs of {(xi,J(xi)), i = 1...N} as the genuine set matic representation of the proposed solution. A set of bio-G. The user then generate a random set of chaff pairs C, and metrics features is first extracted from the user's face images. merge with the G set to generate the final vault. The pairs The extracted features are then quantized and mapped to biin C do not lie on the polynomial. Within the final vault, the nary representation for feature points matching. The propoints are not known whether they belong to set G or C. At duced binary features and the randomly generated key are verification, only when the biometrics representation of the bound using the fuzzy vault scheme. During authentication, authenticator has substantial overlap with the enrolled user, the cryptographic key will be correctly retrieved if the prethe pairs lying on the polynomial can be identified and the sented authentication face features have substantial overlap key can be reconstructed. A few implementation works have with the enrolled ones. The details of the proposed methods been reported in [4] [5][6] based on fingerprints.
RELATED WORKS
are presented in this section. A common problem in the existing solutions is that the key is changeable, but the biometrics signal is not. If the bio-3.1. Feature Extraction metrics signal of an individual is compromised, all the keys generated using that biometrics signal will be compromised.
In this paper, Principal Compoment Analysis (PCA) is adopted Also, except Feng et al's work on iris, which in general has as the feature extractor. PCA is an unsupervised learning small variation, the other works all produce high error rate.
technique which provides an optimal, in the least mean square points can be used for feature matching, the extracted PCA RS decoding since the encoding algorithms of fuzzy vault is features are a set of real numbers, and generally exact match-not the same as RS coding, and therefore RS decoding can ing is impossible. One method is to perform the matching of not be applied to decode the vault [ 14] . In this paper, a similar feature points based on closeness. However, it is not clear scheme as proposed in [5] is adopted for fuzzy vault encoding how to define the closeness. In this paper, we propose a and decoding. A 128-bit random bit string k is first generated method to produce binary representation of face features based using a random number generator. The bit string k is the crypon 2-dimensional quantization ofthe distance vectors between tographic key that needs to be protected and linked with the the extracted features and pairs of random vectors The pro-biometrics signal. To ensure correct recovery of the key from cedure of producing binary features is as follows: the fuzzy vault, k is encoded using Cyclic Redundancy Check d2i =IY-R2i 12-
The final vault is constructed by taking the union of the two set, C U C, and pass through a scrambler so that it iS not clear 6. Quantize d1i and d2i into 256 steps and map to binary which are the feature points and which are the chaff points, bit strings b1i and b2i; {V=(Itk,v),k =1........M +N}.
Fuzzy Vault Decoding
the fuzzy vault with polynomial of degree D = 8, the probability of having k > 9 genuine points fall into the searching
The decoding of the fuzzy vault is based on polynomial re-window (size (2w + 1)2) of an imposter can be computed
construction. An authenticator presents his binary biomet-as P(Ho Hl) Z= EM p where Pk (l1l)pk(I -p)M-k rics features b*, and search for the matchings in the fuzzy k 2 For e vault V. To tolerate errors introduced due to the noisy na-andp 2562 ture of biometrics signal, a windowing process is applied. P(Ho Hl) = 1.08 x 10-17 0 O. Therefore, by setting system bi is divided into two 8-bit trunks corresponding to the x parameters such that FRR=0, zero error rate can be achieved.
and y direction of the 2-D image plane. All the fuzzy vault This also explains the changeability ofbiometrics signal since points that falls into the ±w window in the image plane are even the same biometrics features are presented, if (R1, R2) treated as candidate points. All the candidate points are iden-are different, correct matching can not be obtained. Fig. 2 tified and together with their pair values in the vault form demonstrates the fuzzy vault matching in the projected 2-D a set S. Let K denotes the number of pairs in S, for the image plane. It can be observed that the genuine and imposter reconstruct of a polynomial of degree D, all possible com-points are very well separated in the user-dependent scenario. binations of D + 1 points are identified, with a total number of (DK 1) combinations. Each of the possible combina-4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS tions is used to recover the polynomial using Lagrange interpolating technique. For example, given an identified com-To evaluate the performance of proposed methods, we conbination { (,u1, v1), (/2, V2), *--, (PD+1, VD+1)}, the polyno-ducted our experiments on a well known public face databases mial can be reconstructed as: f(X) = jD+1 fi(X), where ORL [16] . The ORL database contains 400 face images from
[15]. The coefficients in the gen-40 subjects with 10 images each. For some subjects, the im- which is defined as the operating points where FAR and FRR are equal. The first 5 images of each subject is used as train-3.5. User-independent vs User-dependent ing set as well as the gallery set, and the rest as testing set.
All the images are transformed to the PCA domain and the The proposed method for cryptographic key generation can first 20 coefficients are used as face features. The mean ofthe be implemented in two different scenarios: user-independent distance vectors of the gallery set of each person is used for and user-dependent. In the user-independent scenario, all the fuzzy vault encoding while the other images for decoding. An users use the same sets of random matrices (R1, R2), while empirical value of T = 200 is selected for generation of norm in the user-dependent scenario, each user is associated with a spreading vectors (r1, r2). The experiments are performed on distinct sets of (Rl, R2). Due to the distance vectors are used M = 9 -20 number of binary features, with searching winand quantized as the binary features, the spatial closeness of dow size w = -5. To minimize the effect of randomness, features from genuine users can be approximately preserved, all the experiments were performed 5 times and the average For the user-independent scenario, the discriminant characterof the results are reported.
istics of the binary features between different users depends on the separability of the extracted face features in terms of 4.1. User-independent spatial distance.
For the user-dependent scenario, due to the randomness In the user-independent scenario, all the users use a global of (R1, R2) for computing the distance vectors, the probabil-set of (R1, R2). Table 1 details the obtained EER with reity of false matching will be very small. The evaluation can be spect to different number of binary features M and window performed based on hypothesis testing: Ho: the authenticator size w. Fig. 3 depicts the receiver operating curve (ROC) as is a genuine user; H1: the authenticator is an imposter. The a function of M and w. It can be observed that as the winfalse accept rate (FAR) corresponds to P(Ho lH1) and false re-dow size increases, FAR increases and FRR decreases. This ject rate (FRR) corresponds to P(H1 lHo). FAR and FRR are is because the increase of w will introduce imposter points related functions of system parameters (M and w in the prointo the matching window. The same behavior presents as posed system). Assume the genuine and imposter's feature the number of binary features M increase. The selected polypoints are randomly projected onto the 2-D plane, and there is nomial require 9 matched points. If the number of available no overlap between the searching window of an imposter. For points increase, the possibility of matching will increase. Sig. Processing, pp. 244-250, 2006 In this paper, we focus on face based cryptographic key eral and can also be applied to other biometrics molalities. A major problem with the current fuzzy vault based scheme is
[16] ATT Laboratories Cambridge, ORE face databse, the computational complexity. In the future, we are going to www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/dtg/attarchive/facedatabase.html. elaborate the proposed methods by introducing error correction techniques, and study new methods for fast and secure binding of biometrics with cryptographic keys.
